Warfare, industry and capital are all evolving at once.
How wars are fought, where capability is proven, and how it gets bought are changing together. Most capital is still running the old playbook.
New reality9
Nine shifts most capital is still pricing the old way.
01Warfare is shifting, not cycling
Old playbook: Bigger budgets mean more of the same platforms, bought from the same primes.
The money is moving to attritable, software-defined systems, re-engineered weekly against a live adversary and judged on cost per effect. A $300–600 FPV drone takes out targets priced in millions.
02The sustainment tail was the product
Old playbook: The primes sell hardware.
They sell decades of operating and support attached to it: roughly 70% of a weapon system’s life-cycle cost, per the U.S. GAO. A cheap, attritable system doesn’t just beat the platform; it deletes the annuity behind it.
03So the primes will buy
Old playbook: Incumbents will build the replacement themselves.
They can’t build it without eating their own economics, so acquisition becomes the clearing mechanism. Defense-tech exits hit a record $54.4B in 2025, about 72% of them acquisitions (PitchBook). Strategic M&A is our base-case exit.
04Neo-primes: pick two
Old playbook: The next defense giants will be built at venture valuations.
Raise at 30 times revenue, build at a price the customer will actually pay, return the multiple investors underwrote: you get two. Listed primes trade at two to four times revenue. That’s arithmetic, not sentiment.
05Capacity beats inventory
Old playbook: Whoever produces the most wins.
It isn’t the bicycle factory that wins; it’s the factory that produces bicycle factories. Russia outproduces Ukraine in drones roughly two to one and is still losing the exchange. The asset is the ability to change what you build inside a week.
06Tri-use, not dual-use
Old playbook: Dual-use is enough.
Defense validates the technology and pays first. Civil markets (ports, airports, borders, critical infrastructure) broaden it. Commercial is where the volume, the margin and the exit live. We won’t back a company whose only customer is a defense ministry.
07Data, IP and integration are the only moats left
Old playbook: Great technology is the moat.
AI commoditizes code. What’s defensible is proprietary data that compounds with every customer, real IP held where it will be enforced, and integration that’s painful to rip out. All three, not two: two out of three is a feature, not a company.
08Non-U.S. affiliation is a feature, not a bug
Old playbook: A U.S. connection is always the advantage.
Europe now writes preference into law: its EDIP program requires 65% European content in a funded product’s components, with design authority in the EU. Every company we back is domiciled outside Ukraine before the first serious conversation.
09Investable and venture-backable aren’t the same thing
Old playbook: Valuations, letters of intent, pilots and logos signal traction.
We underwrite booked revenue and repeat orders, adoption inside a real unit, a data or integration position that compounds, and a price we can still exit from. Valuation is not validation.
Why Ukraine and the eastern flank7
Ukraine is the proving ground and stays our center of gravity. The eastern flank is where proven capability scales.
Tested under fire
Incoming fire means instant feedback: build Monday, fly Thursday, change Friday. A drone tested in a backyard isn’t the same asset as one flown against a peer adversary that’s jamming it.
Data no one can fake
Front-line telemetry trains AI models on data competitors can’t buy, simulate or replicate.
Same threat surface
Poland, the Baltics and the Nordics face the adversary Ukraine faces. A company solving for the front line is solving for the entire eastern flank.
Allies are pulling it outward
European states are seeking joint ventures with Ukrainian producers and drawing them into their supply chains. The expertise, data and founders won’t evaporate at a ceasefire; they radiate along the flank.
The bar doesn’t move
Every company earns front-line validation: it tests with Ukrainian end users today, or brings a differentiated product into Ukraine to earn it. We don’t back companies with no interest in the front line.
Why now
Output has scaled
Ukraine’s defense output grew from $1B in 2022 to $9B in 2024, and its production capacity reached $35B in 2025.
Budgets are rising for a decade
NATO’s target is now 5% of GDP by 2035, and Europe is rearming on a ten-year horizon, ceasefire or not.
Where the alpha is hiding4
Four places the market is mispricing.
The capital gap
Ukraine’s defense output grew ninefold in two years. Its startups drew €49M of venture money in 2025, against €2.6B across European NATO members.
Per year, € millions
- Ukraine
- Europe (NATO members)
Data
| Year | Ukraine | Europe |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 | – | €200M |
| 2022 | – | €350M |
| 2023 | €0.2M | €500M |
| 2024 | €32M | €850M |
| 2025 | €49M | €2.6B |
Europe: European NATO countries, excluding Ukraine (McKinsey analysis of PitchBook data, Feb 2026). Ukraine: disclosed venture rounds of $0.2M, $37.9M and $57.2M (PitchBook, Jul 2026), converted at the 2 Jan 2026 rate McKinsey used; no 2021–22 figures published.
Annual output, indexed to 2022 = 1×
- Ukraine
- Europe (ASD members)
Data
| Year | Ukraine | Europe |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $1B · 1× | €136.7B · 1× |
| 2023 | $3B · 3× | €161.1B · 1.2× |
| 2024 | $9B · 9× | €183.4B · 1.3× |
Ukraine: weapons and equipment produced (Ministry of Strategic Industries, Apr 2025); production capacity reached $35B in 2025 (Ministry of Defence). Europe: defence industry turnover of ASD members, the EU17 plus the UK, Norway and Türkiye (ASD Facts & Figures 2025). Each indexed in its own currency; 2025 output not yet published.
Capital hasn’t caught up to the source. We invest in the gap: in-country, and early.
Public markets repriced; private rounds haven’t
European defense stocks have re-rated, and large asset managers have dropped their defense exclusions. Early-stage private rounds haven’t caught up, so we buy before that capital arrives.
Western capability, Ukrainian entry prices
Combat-proven companies raise at a fraction of Western entry prices for the same capability class, so they can be sold at prices primes will actually pay.
The layers, not the airframes
Airframes are a race to zero margin. The value sits in what every platform depends on: sensing, communications, electronic warfare and software.